About
How this site works
5105 Intel rebuilds every hour from 15 primary sources and correlates them: CVEs with exploits, detections and the actors using them; actors with their targets, techniques and malware; news with all of the above. Every source, its terms and the method behind each feature are listed below.
Who runs this
Sources
15 feeds, refreshed hourly| Source | What it provides here | Terms | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities | Confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, required actions, deadlines, ransomware use, vendor advisories | Public domain (US government) | Pending |
| NIST National Vulnerability Database | New CVEs, CVSS, CWE, affected products and version ranges, references | Public domain. This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. | Pending |
| CVE.org (cvelistV5) | CVE records for older CVEs, vendor version data, CISA SSVC assessments, weakness names | CVE Terms of Use | Pending |
| FIRST EPSS | Daily probability of exploitation for every CVE, and 30-day history | Free to use with attribution to FIRST | Pending |
| Metasploit Framework | Exploit modules per CVE: rank, checks, targets, authors | BSD-3-Clause | Pending |
| Exploit Database | Published exploits per CVE: type, platform, author, verification | GPL-2.0 or later | Pending |
| Nuclei templates | Scanner templates per CVE | MIT | Pending |
| PoC-in-GitHub | Public proof-of-concept repositories per CVE, with creation dates | CC0-1.0 | Pending |
| Sigma rules | Detection rules mapped to CVEs and ATT&CK techniques | Detection Rule License 1.1 (rules credited to their authors) | Pending |
| MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise | Groups, software, techniques, campaigns, detection strategies, mitigations | ATT&CK Terms of Use (free with attribution) | Pending |
| MISP threat-actor galaxy | Actor aliases, origin, and the Council on Foreign Relations tracker fields (sponsor, victims, target categories) | CC0-1.0 / BSD-2-Clause | Pending |
| ransomlook.io | Victims posted on ransomware leak sites, last 30 days | Public API. Leak-site links are not republished. | Pending |
| Have I Been Pwned | Every public breach with accounts affected and data exposed | CC BY 4.0 | Pending |
| 8 security news publishers | Headlines and publisher teasers, tagged with the CVEs, actors and vendors they mention | Headlines link to the publisher; articles are not republished | Pending |
| Natural Earth via world-atlas | Country shapes for the maps | Public domain data, ISC-licensed package | Pending |
Methods
- Triage P1 to P4Every CVE gets a patch priority from evidence of exploitation, not severity alone: P1 exploited, P2 weaponized or likely next, P3 public exploit code or high EPSS, P4 no signal yet. The reason is shown with every label.
- Weaponization ladderTracks each CVE from disclosure through GitHub PoC, ExploitDB, Nuclei template and Metasploit module to confirmed exploitation, with the date of each step.
- Early warning and track recordRanks CVEs outside KEV by the signals that usually come before exploitation. Every CVE entering the top 25 is logged with a timestamp, and the track record counts how many CISA later confirmed and how many days earlier we flagged them.
- KEV blind spotsHeavily weaponized CVEs that CISA has never listed: the gaps in KEV-driven patching.
- Exploitability in plain wordsCVSS vectors are read into who can exploit a CVE (network or local, login or not, user action or not) and what that means for exposure.
- Detection fallbackWhen no CVE-specific Sigma rule exists, each CVE points to the ATT&CK techniques its exploitation falls under, with their detection strategies, rules and mitigations.
- Evidence for every linkLinks between actors, countries and industries show where they come from: a quoted sentence from ATT&CK or MISP, or an entry in the CFR tracker.
- Hunting guidesFor each actor and malware family: initial-access techniques, Sigma coverage of its techniques, detection gaps and the mitigations that cover the most of its behaviour.
- Estimated ransomware sectorsVictims are classified by the first industry their published description names. These are estimates and are labelled as such.
Exports
CSV and JSON, rebuilt hourly- Likely next (early warning)
- Weaponized in the last 7 days
- Weaponized but not in KEV
- Added to KEV in the last 30 days
- All CVEs published in the last 7 days
News sources
Exploit code is listed so defenders can assess and test exposure; only test systems you are authorised to test. Attribution, origin and sector data come from public sources and can be wrong or out of date; each link shows its evidence so you can judge it. Ransomware victim names come from criminal leak sites and are shown without links.
How to read this page
- P1 to P4
- Our patch priority. P1 patch now: confirmed exploited in the wild (CISA KEV, or CISA reports active exploitation). P2 this week: a Metasploit module or Nuclei template exists, it ranks in the top 25 likely next, or EPSS is 50% or more. P3 schedule: public exploit code, EPSS 10% or more, or CVSS 9+. P4 routine: no exploitation signal yet. The reason is always shown next to the label.
- Weaponization ladder
- Five squares, left to right: GitHub PoC, ExploitDB entry, Nuclei template, Metasploit module, exploited in the wild (red). Each step lowers the skill needed to attack: a Nuclei template means anyone can scan the internet for it, a Metasploit module means anyone can exploit it with one command.
- EPSS
- FIRST's Exploit Prediction Scoring System: the estimated probability that a CVE is exploited in the next 30 days, from observed attack data. The percentile compares it with every other CVE. It measures likelihood, not impact.
- KEV
- CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: CVEs with reliable evidence of exploitation in the wild. The due date is binding for US federal agencies and a useful upper limit for everyone else.
- CVSS
- Severity if exploited, 0 to 10. We read the vector into plain words: where the attacker must be (network, adjacent, local), whether a login or user action is needed, and what is impacted. Severity is not likelihood: most critical CVEs are never exploited.
- CISA SSVC
- CISA's own assessment in the CVE record: exploitation "none", "poc" (public proof of concept) or "active" (seen in attacks).
- Likely next
- CVEs outside KEV ranked by signals that usually come before exploitation. Each entry into the top 25 is logged, and the track record counts how many CISA later confirmed.
- Evidence
- Every link between an actor and a country or industry shows where it comes from: a quoted sentence from MITRE ATT&CK or the MISP galaxy, or an entry in the Council on Foreign Relations Cyber Operations Tracker. Links without a quote come from that tracker's lists.
- Estimated sector
- Ransomware victims are classified by the first industry named in the description the group publishes. Posts with too little detail stay unclassified.